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A VIRTUOUS STATE WOULD NOT ASSIGN 
CORRECTIONAL HOUSING BASED  
ON ABILITY TO PAY 
Bradley W. Moore* † 
Introduction 
Pay-to-stay jails expose the moral tension between the dominant theo-
ries of punishment: retributivism and deterrence. A turn to a third major 
moral theory—virtue ethics—resolves this tension. According to virtue eth-
ics, the moral worth of an action follows from both the character of the 
action and the disposition of the actor. Virtuous acts promote human flour-
ishing—the central goal of life—when they are the right actions performed 
for the right reasons. The virtue ethics theory of punishment suggests that 
pay-to-stay jails conflict with the promotion of human flourishing. A virtu-
ous state’s criminal justice system would not include fee-based incarceration 
because it undermines the role of punishment in fostering practical judg-
ment, an essential prerequisite to encouraging human flourishing. Neither 
the retributivist desire to punish offenders equally in identical (and shoddy) 
prison conditions nor the deterrence effect of requiring inmates to cover the 
costs of their confinement is motivated by virtuous reasons. Furthermore, 
the resolution of the pay-to-stay jails dilemma using virtue ethics highlights 
why retributivism and deterrence should be rejected as theories of punish-
ment in favor of a virtue ethics-based approach. 
I. Retribution and Deterrence: Conflicting Answers  
to the Pay-to-Stay Question 
Retributivism, which imposes punishment in proportion to the criminal 
offender’s moral desert, suggests that pay-to-stay jails are unjustified. This 
deontological moral theory, based substantially on the writings of Immanuel 
Kant, holds that punishment is a categorical imperative: the state has the 
right and the duty to punish all morally blameworthy acts. This duty exists 
irrespective of the positive or negative consequences that follow from the act 
of punishment. Proportionate punishment brings human relations back into 
the proper alignment that the morally blameworthy crime disrupted. From a 
retributivist point of view—assuming that the original level of punishment is 
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just—prisoners paying fees for more comfortable jail-time experiences re-
ceive less than their deserved punishment for a reason unrelated to their 
blameworthiness: their ability to pay. Thus, retributivism would not permit 
pay-to-stay programs. 
Applying the other main theory of punishment—deterrence—to pay-to-
stay jails yields a contrary result. Deterrence actually favors pay-to-stay 
programs. Like other utilitarian justifications of punishment such as reha-
bilitation and incapacitation, deterrence is a consequentialist moral theory: 
punishment is justified if its positive consequences outweigh its harms. The 
state should punish criminals only to the extent that such punishment suffi-
ciently deters them and other prospective criminals from committing future 
criminal acts. From a deterrence perspective, the decisions of California city 
jails to implement pay-to-stay programs reflect a novel way to address acute 
overcrowding and underfunding, both of which are social harms in their 
own right. Pay-to-stay programs increase the overall welfare of jails and 
municipalities by lowering net correctional costs while simultaneously de-
creasing deterrence only marginally. Offender participants in pay-to-stay 
programs—perhaps due to a comfortable position in society correlated with 
their ability to pay the fees—still wish to avoid returning to jail, indicating 
that specific deterrence remains effective for the individual offender. For 
example, in “For $82 a Day, Book a Cell in a 5-Star Jail,” the New York 
Times described the attitude of one inmate who served her jail term in a pay-
to-stay facility: “Ms. Brockett, who normally works as a bartender in Los 
Angeles, said the experience was one she never cared to repeat. ‘It does look 
decent,’ she said, ‘but you still feel exactly where you are.’” In fact, as the 
conditions in pay-to-stay facilities are better than in regular jails, these pro-
grams cause less harm to the offender for the same (or nearly the same) 
amount of deterrence. Only a subset of criminals (those who can afford to 
pay) receive the easier jail experience, preserving the general deterrent 
effect of jail on society as a whole. Meanwhile, jails—like their prisoners—
also benefit from reduced overcrowding.  In short, deterrence levels do not 
change significantly for pay-to-stay programs, and the programs alleviate 
overcrowding and underfunding. Therefore, deterrence justifies pay-to-stay 
programs. 
II. A Virtuous Alternative
As deterrence and retributivism provide conflicting answers to questions 
of the proper form and level of punishment for pay-to-stay participants and 
other inmates, criminal justice requires a third moral theory for the justifica-
tion of punishment. Virtue ethics, also referred to as Aretaic theory, offers a 
viable alternative to deterrence and retributivism that better accounts for 
both the practical and aspirational purposes of punishment. The essence of 
virtue ethics is that the moral value of an action depends neither on its con-
formity to categorical moral rules, as in deontological theory, nor on the 
overall happiness that the action causes, as in consequentialist theory. 
Rather, the morality of an action depends on both the action’s character and 
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on the moral agent’s disposition while performing the action. The central 
purpose of virtue ethics is to answer the question, “How should I live?” in-
stead of the question, “What is the right action?” Virtue ethics’ answer is 
that a person should live in a way that cultivates the virtues necessary for 
human flourishing. A moral agent exercises virtue through practical reason-
ing; knowing the proper action depends on wisdom, deliberation, and moral 
judgment.  In other words, a virtuous agent acts not just rightly, but for the 
right reasons. 
In On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, Professor Kyron 
Huigens, the strongest advocate of a virtue ethics theory of criminal law, 
describes the justification of punishment as follows: 
Aristotelian punishment theory attempts to describe the criminal law in 
terms of virtue. Virtue, for Aristotle, was not adherence to moral duties 
against one’s inclinations, but a quality of exemplary practical judgment by 
which the agent does right because the right is what he wants to do—not in 
the sense that he wishes to comply with a rule, but in the sense that his 
judgment is so well attuned to the good in ordinary affairs that the right 
course of action and its objectives are desirable to him. I have argued that 
the justification of punishment turns on an assessment of whether the de-
fendant exhibited a lack of Aristotelian virtue in the conduct that violated 
the criminal law, because the inculcation of this kind of virtue is a justify-
ing end of the criminal law. 
If criminal law’s function in society is to promote virtue, then punish-
ment is justified only if it facilitates the development of practical reason: the 
tendency and motivation to do the right act because one values the proper 
reasons for acting rightly. When a criminal makes an unvirtuous choice, 
punishment plays an educative role. Punishment does not act, however, as a 
deterrent—a person should choose the right action out of a desire to do so, 
not out of fear of sanction. A criminal offense constitutes a failure of practi-
cal reason: the perpetrator acted through the wrong means or for the wrong 
ends. However, virtuous punishment habituates the offender to form a desire 
to act rightly for the right reasons.  
Therefore, practical reason should guide the state in deciding what pun-
ishment to impose. Imposing either excessive or overly merciful punishment 
would not be virtuous if it inhibits rather than promotes the development of 
practical reason in the offender. The state should also impose punishment 
only for the right reasons—the cultivation of virtue and the promotion of 
human flourishing. The correctness of the punishment depends on the prac-
tical wisdom present in the justice system as a whole. Individual judges 
exercise practical wisdom when they determine fault and punishment. 
Likewise, the policies of the state should be evaluated based on the extent to 
which they reflect practical wisdom and instill virtue. 
III. The Virtue Ethics Answer to the Pay-to-Stay Question
Pay-to-stay jail policies inhibit, rather than foster, the instillation of vir-
tue and the promotion of practical reasoning. Consider first the prisoner 
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relegated to standard jail facilities. Those prisoners who cannot afford pay-
to-stay jail upgrades will likely feel resentment at their disparate treatment. 
Jail already alienates many criminals and destroys a desire to act rightly for 
the right reasons. Resentment of pay-to-stay jails can only exacerbate the 
risk that prisoners will not experience punishment in a way that promotes 
practical judgment. Second, prisoners who serve time in pay-to-stay facili-
ties will be less likely to perceive punishment in a virtue-developing way. 
Although they may feel less resentment, the sense of entitlement that they 
may feel could blunt the educative effect of punishment. Finally, pay-to-stay 
jail policies threaten the fostering of the state’s own practical judgment. 
With these programs, the government has chosen to solve a broader crisis of 
overcrowding and underfunding by taking advantage of the different wealth 
levels of its prisoners, irrespective of the effect on these prisoners’ develop-
ment of practical judgment. While citizens might believe that a program to 
provide more funding for jails and reduce crowding is good for promoting 
virtue, a state needs to create the right kind of program, for the right rea-
sons. A state undermines the virtue-promoting function of the criminal law 
when it creates a program that does not consider its citizens to be equal be-
fore the law.  
Exploring the public reaction to the punishment of Paris Hilton, a recent 
California jail guest, can further explain how virtue ethics best resolves the 
problem with pay-to-stay jails. While resentment at the idea that Ms. Hilton 
might pay for a more pleasant jail stay might sound like a retributivist con-
cern, the amount of punishment is not the issue; forty-five days in jail for 
driving with a suspended license is, if anything, on the harsher end of possi-
ble penalties. Rather, the nature and the function of the punishment are what 
matter to most people. If Ms. Hilton receives a harsh punishment but does 
not change her attitude towards the law, then people will still not be satis-
fied. The key role of Ms. Hilton’s punishment is to teach her to align her 
character and her disposition with the virtues for a flourishing life, so that 
she can make the choices that a virtuous moral agent would make. Virtue 
ethics best explains the resentment people felt from speculation that Ms. 
Hilton might opt for the more tolerable pay-to-stay jail facilities.  
However, critics might raise two major objections to the use of virtue 
ethics to resolve the pay-to-stay jails dilemma. First, virtue ethics begs the 
question: there needs to be some agreement on what the virtues are before 
society can say differential jail facilities are not virtuous. Second, society 
already conditions the delivery of services on the consumer’s ability to pay 
in many contexts—why should jail be different?  
The virtue ethicist has a reply to these criticisms. First, virtue ethics is 
impressive not because of how little agreement exists about what a flourish-
ing life looks like but how much agreement exists. For example, in Non-
relative virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, the philosopher Martha Nuss-
baum observes that while local understandings of the virtues may vary, there 
is wide cross-cultural consensus about what the virtues are. Furthermore, 
even if some disagreement exists as to the constitution of a virtuous life, 
virtue ethics is less likely to lead to absurd results than rule-based theories 
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like retributivism and deterrence, which have more trouble managing equi-
table exceptions and moral complexity. Even if retributivism and deterrence 
can codify the rules that should govern in a given situation, practical wis-
dom is necessary to apply those rules. Ultimately, it is the application of 
practical wisdom, not the content of a moral code, that determines the out-
come of a moral dilemma. Virtue ethics avoids the senseless application of 
moral rules by allowing for a full appreciation of the equities in an ethical 
conflict. Second, even if society as a whole is improperly structured on the 
basis of ability to pay, it would not follow that virtue ethics is an invalid 
moral theory; rather, society itself may need some restructuring in order to 
further promote human flourishing. A society that better provides its citizens 
the opportunity to live a flourishing life might start by eliminating pay-to-
stay jails, but it would not stop there. 
Conclusion 
Retributivism and deterrence should be rejected as the dominant theories 
of punishment because the scope of a virtue ethics critique of the criminal 
justice system would not end with pay-to-stay jails. Virtue ethics explains 
society’s discomfort with municipalities’ pay-to-stay responses to over-
crowding and underfunding. The virtuous state, through the application of 
practical reason, would have chosen another solution, one that would pro-
mote practical reason in prisoners and citizens more generally. To the extent 
that the current correctional system fails to develop practical reason in pris-
oners in other ways, many other reforms are necessary.  
Shifting to a virtue ethics approach would best capture the true purpose 
of punishment. Commonly cited problems with the prison system as a 
whole—inordinate costs, inability to prepare prisoners for reentry into soci-
ety, excessive mandatory minimum sentences—would likely find better 
resolution if the state were to take a virtue ethics approach to crime and pun-
ishment. The dominant theories of punishment, deterrence and retributivism, 
rely on moral rules that cannot account for the nuance and complexity of 
competing moral claims. Therefore, as pay-to-stay jails show, the state can-
not successfully balance the competing concerns of deterrence and 
retributivism. Virtue ethics avoids this trap by focusing on character and 
disposition, not on specific acts. As such, the state should reject retributivist 
and deterrent justifications for punishment, and all criminal justice reforms 
should instead be evaluated by the standard of whether or not the virtuous 
state would choose such reforms. 
